Secure and reliable communication over the wiretap channel of delayed channel state information (CSI) is an important realistic subject for the study of physical layer secure coding. In this paper a communication model of this delay CSI assumption is presented on the basis of a simplified symmetric compound wiretap channel. Then on this delay CSI communication model, a secure scheme of polar coding based one time pad chaining structure is proposed which successfully achieves the weak security and reliability for the degraded wiretap channel cases but fails to achieve either weak or strong security for the non-degraded cases, due to the unidentifiable problem of the neither secure nor reliable polarized subset. To solve this remaining problem of achieving the strong security in non-degraded delay CSI cases, a new solution call modified multi-block chaining structure is presented in which the original subset of frozen bit is constructed for conveying functional random bits securely. Finally by combining this modified multi-block chaining structure with the one time pad chaining structure, an explicit strong security polar coding scheme is proposed which has almost achieved the average secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption under the delay CSI assumption with both reliability and strong security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of achieving the secrecy capacity of wiretap channel (WTC) has always been an open problem for physical layer secure communication [1] . In the last decade, after the invention of Y. Zhao was with the College of Informatics, Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan, Hubei, China. E-mail:
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polar code [2] , secure polar coding schemes had successfully achieved the secrecy capacities of Wyner's wiretap channel [3] , [4] and several extended wiretap channel models [5] - [11] . All these notable capacity achieving studies have in common that they are under the idealized assumption of perfect channel state information (CSI) in which channel realization is fixed and known by the legitimate parties during the entire communication process.
However, in practical communication this perfect CSI assumption can barely hold since there are always uncertainties for CSI [13] . For instance, legitimate parties may unable to accurately estimate the channel condition due to the limitation of physical environment; besides it cannot be ensure that the information of eavesdropper's adversarial behavior is instantly known by the legitimate parties. Relevant to these practical situation, realistic uncertain CSI assumptions are proposed, such as the compound wiretap channel [14] and arbitrarily varying wiretap channel [15] in which the actual CSI is assumed unknown and varying within a known set of uncertain CSI. Existing studies have already presented the characterization of secrecy capacities under these uncertain CSI assumptions [16] , [17] , but how to achieve these capacities are still open problems.
On the bright side of practical situation, although legitimate parties may not know the actual CSI instantly, they can manage to obtain it with hindsight. This sort of delay CSI case has been studied in [18] that the varying state is sent back to the legitimate transmitter by the legitimate receiver through a feedback channel after some time delay. Also, another supportive study is proposed in [19] that practically legitimate parties can detect the physical effect in the environment coursed by the varying of CSI and then learn the CSI from the detected information with high probability. Therefore as a step in solving the secrecy capacity achieving problem of the uncertain CSI assumption, we begin with presenting the notion of a realistic delay CSI assumption and exploring the explicit secure coding solution for this delay CSI case.
Specifically, we build the communication model of delay CSI assumption on a simplified compound wiretap channel [13] . In this model, the main channel for legitimate block communication is known and fixed, but the realization of wiretap channel for eavesdropper is unknown and varying over each blocks. Also we assume that
• Main channel and all the possible wiretap channel states are symmetric discrete memoryless channels but with no necessarily degraded relations;
• Legitimate parties know all the possible states of wiretap channel;
• The state of wiretap channel remains constant during each blocks;
• Legitimate parties can accurately obtain the wiretap channel state information only after each block communication (the delay CSI case).
Note that in the delay CSI model, reliability of communication can be achieved by the physical layer coding since the main channel condition is known and fixed. But the achieving of security is much hard due to the uncertainty of wiretapping CSI. Even though the CSI can be obtained after each block transmission, the precise channel state is still absent at the time of secure encoding.
One possible solution for this delay CSI case is the one time pad (OTP) chaining method proposed in [19] which coincidentally has a similar index partition structure as the basic secure polar coding scheme in [3] . However after combining the chaining encryption method and the basic secure polar coding together, we have found that under the reliability criterion the constructed polar coding based OTP chaining structure can only achieve the weak security in the degraded delay CSI cases, but fails to achieve neither weak security nor strong security in the non-degraded delay CSI cases. For strong security polar coding, the mostly adapted technique is the multi-block chaining structure proposed in [4] . The basic idea of this technique is to setup a reliable and secure pre-transmitting for the bits of the unreliable and insecure subset of each channel blocks. Unfortunately this technique cannot be directly applied to the delay CSI case since the unreliable and insecure subset is unidentifiable without the CSI realization.
Therefore, for the strong security coding problem of delay CSI assumption, we present a new modified multi-block chaining structure and combing it with the polar coding based OTP chaining structure. Analysis results indicate that the proposed strong security polar coding scheme can achieve both reliability and strong security. Also it has been proven that the secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption can be almost achieved under the delay CSI assumption by our proposed secure coding scheme.
The outline of this paper is as follow. Section II presents the notations and then introduces the communication model of delay CSI assumption. Section III presents the construction of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure and discusses its performance and remaining problems. Section IV presents the construction of strong security polar coding scheme with the modified multi-block chaining structure and then analyzes its performance theoretically. Finally, Section V concludes the paper. 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Z|X which represents a potential transition probability of wiretap channel. p Y |X is the transition probability of main channel. For main channel and all potential wiretap channels, they are symmetric but with no necessarily degraded relations. For each N -length channel blocks, the wiretap channel state S is chosen by the eavesdropper from S with a realization s and then remains constant during the block
For legitimate parties, they can know the precise CSI only after each block communication. The communication process of the system model for t-th channel block is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Specifically as
• Eavesdropper Eve chooses the CSI S t form S with realization s t = s i and then obtains Z N st from her chosen wiretap channel with p
• Legitimate transmitter Alice encodes the message M into X N and transmits it to Bob over the main channel with p Y N |X N , but she does not know the actual CSI s t for the wiretap channel only until the end of t-th block communication.
• Legitimate receiver Bob receives the main channel outputs Y N and decodes it intoM . He also does not know the actual CSI s t for the wiretap channel only until the end of t-th block communciation.
Definition 2 (Performance) For the communication model with a CSI value s i ∈ S, define a corresponding (2 N R , N ) code c i ∈ C, C = {c 1 , c 2 , ...}, then the performance of a code c i is measured by
• error probability:
• information leakage to Eve:
Definition 3 (Criterions) For state s i , rate R is achievable if sequence of code c i exists under the criterions listed below:
• reliability criterion:
• weak security criterion:
• strong security criterion:
Note that reliability can be achieved with a vanishing error probability of decoding the messages. Weak security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage rate. And strong security can be achieved with a vanishing information leakage.
Now we discuss the secrecy capacity of the delay CSI assumption under the reliability and strong security criterions. Considering the simplified compound wiretap channel model with CSI uncertainty set S, we first discuss the characterization of the secrecy capacities for the no CSI case and the perfect CSI case.
Let C s−noCSI (S) be the secrecy capacity over S for no CSI case. The bound of this secrecy capacity with no CSI has already been summarized in [13] that for its lower bound, have
and for its upper bound, have
Let C s−perfectCSI (S) be the secrecy capacity over S for perfect CSI case. In this case, the actual CSI is instantly known by the legitimate parties, thus the system model turns into the basic wiretap channel model. Then according to the capacity result in [20] , for every CSI value
and over the set S, have
Then let C s−delayCSI (S) be the secrecy capacity over S for delay CSI case. Comparing with the no CSI case, delay CSI case is less pessimistic since the CSI of past blocks is accurately known. But comparing with the perfect CSI case, delay CSI case is less optimistic since the CSI of current channel block is unknown. Thus the secrecy capacity of this middle ground delay CSI case satisfies
For perfect CSI cases with asymmetric channels, secrecy capacity achieving polar codes can be constructed by applying the mature technique of source polarization [21] , [22] since which can generate the optimally distributed channel input for achieving the asymmetric secrecy capacity.
However in delay CSI cases, this asymmetric coding technique is hard to apply, because without the CSI realization of asymmetric wiretap channel, it is almost impossible to know the optimal distribution for achieving the asymmetric secrecy capacity. Therefore in this paper, we only study the secrecy capacity achieving problem of symmetric channel case under the delay CSI assumption.
III. POLAR CODING BASED ONE TIME PAD CHAINING STRUCTURE
In this section, we are going to combine the OTP chaining method presented in [19] with the polar codes to construct a polar coding based OTP chaining structure for the system model of delay CSI assumption.
Note that in the proposed system model of delay CSI assumption, the main channel and the wiretap channels of all the potential CSIs are set symmetric. Thus for any s i ∈ S, we assume that the legitimate parties know the optimal distribution of channel input X N to achieve the symmetric secrecy capacity in (10) without having the actual CSI realization, and these secrecy capacities are all positive under the perfect CSI assumption.
A. Polarized Subsets Division
First we present the channel polarization for both main channel and all potential wiretap channels.
Definition 4 (Bhattaharyya parameter) Consider a pair of random variables
where X is a binary random variable and Y is a finite-alphabet random variable. To measure the amount of randomness in X given Y , the Bhattaharyya parameter is defined as
According to the channel polarization theory in [2] for β ∈ (0, 1/2), δ N = 2 −N β , have
• polarization of main channel with the known and fixed transition probability p Y |X :
• polarization of the wiretap channel for every potential CSI value s i = p
Z|X , s i ∈ S:
Note that for legitimate parties, they know the fixed transition probability p Y |X of the main channel for entire multi-block communication, thus they can directly have the polarization result of main channel from the beginning. But they do not know the polarization result of current wiretap channel only until the end of current block communication. For eavesdropper Eve, she knows all the polarization results of main channel and wiretap channel at the beginning of the communication.
Then based on the above channel polarization results, for each potential CSI value s i = p
Z|X , s i ∈ S, we can have the polar subsets division of the channel block index [[1, N ]] as follow.
Note that for each s i = p 
Also note that for degraded wiretap channel cases [4] , have
and
B. Polar Coding Based OTP Chaining Structure
On the basis of the polar subsets division in (19) , we now construct the polar coding based OTP chaining structure for the delay CSI case. the CSI realization s t , the actual division of polarized subsets is denoted as (I t , R t , B t , F t ). For legitimate parties, since they do not have the CSI realization of the current wiretap channel at the point of encoding and decoding, they can only guarantee the reliability of the transmitted information by the fixed reliable polarized subset L X|Y of the main channel. But every time when the current block communication is complete, they can accurately have the CSI realization s t and then obtain the polarized subsets (I t , R t , B t , F t ). Therefore they can identify the bits that have just been reliably and securely transmitted, as the part in I t , and also the bits that have just been reliably but insecurely transmitted, as the part in R t .
Then according to the idea of the OTP chaining method in [19] , since bits in I t have been securely transmitted, they can be used as the key stream to one-time-pad the message M t+1 for (t + 1)-th time block communication by the legitimate transmitter; also since bits in I t have been reliably transmitted, the key stream can be correctly decoded by the legitimate receiver and then used to decrypt the received message in (t + 1)-th time block communication.
It seems that the polarized subset division of polar codes can well match the idea of the OTP chaining structure in [19] to provide a secure communication. Unfortunately, there are still flaws for this combined structure. In the non-degraded delay CSI case, since the realization of CSI can only be obtained by the legitimate parties after each block communication, the unreliable and insecure subset B of the current block can not be identified from the unreliable subset L X|Y c at the time of encoding. Thus for reliability consideration, as a preliminary solution for the structure, subset B is assigned with the publicly known frozen bits together with the original frozen subset F. However, this preliminary solution may compromise the security in non-degraded cases, which will be emphatically discussed in the following sections.
Now we present the construction of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure that is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Note that polarized subsets (H X|Y , L X|Y ) remain constant during the entire by using the succussive cancelation (SC) decoding [2] : 
Block communication of time t, t ∈ [[1, T ]]:
• Legitimate parties obtain the divided subsets of last block as (I t−1 , R t−1 , B t−1 , F t−1 );
• Assume a binary message M t that satisfies |M t | = |I t−1 |. Then encrypt |M t | into ciphertext
-uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to subset R t−1 ;
-publicly known frozen bits are assigned to subset L X|Y c ;
• Alice encodes u 
• Bob extractsû
as the ciphertext and decrypts it by M t =û 
C. Performance Discussion
Now we analyze the performance of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure and discuss its existing problems.
In the structure, ciphertext is carried by U I t−1 t , and key stream is carried by U It t , thus the reliability of the secure polar coding scheme is measured by the error probability of decoding the ciphertext and key stream from time 0 to time t. 
then for the successive cancellation decoding, β ∈ (0, 1/2), δ N = 2 −N β , the block error probability is bounded by
Proposition 1 For the communication model of delay CSI assumption, reliability can be achieved by the proposed polar coding based OTP chaining structure with setting B as frozen bit set.
Proof: In the entire T + 1 times block communication, there are T times ciphertext transmissions from time 1 to time T , and T times key stream transmissions from time 0 to time T − 1.
Let P e (T + 1) be the decoding error probability of Bob for both ciphertext and key stream, have
where (a) is due to Lemma 1 and (I t , I t−1 ) ⊆ L X|Y . Therefore the reliability can be achieved with a fixed T .
Next we discuss the security of the polar coding based encrypted chaining structure under the reliability criterion.
Lemma 2 Considering a single block transmission with polar subset division in (19) that 
Thus by applying the Fano's inequality, have
Note that in the structure, message are encrypted by one time pad, thus the security can be measured by the information leakage of the key streams which are carried by U It t . Let L t be the information leakage of block t, then have L t = I(U It t ; Z N t ). Since for the entire T + 1 blocks the transmission of key streams are independent between each blocks, the overall information leakage of key streams is
Proposition 2 For the communication model of delay CSI assumption, the proposed polar coding based OTP chaining structure can only achieve the weak security under the degraded wiretap channel cases.
Proof: To simplify the expression, we omit most of the subscript t in the following discussion.
Note that in the structure, in order to maintain the reliability, subsets U F and U B are set for the publicly known frozen bits together. Therefore Eve can have the U F ∪B when she decodes the wiretapped message. Thus for the single block information leakage L t , have
where (a) is because U F ∪B is the publicly known frozen bits, (b) is due to Lemma 2 and U R are uniformly distributed random bits. From (21), have
(38)
In non-degraded cases, since neither |B| nor |B|/N is vanishing when N → ∞, the security criterions cannot be achieved for the communication of either the single block or the entire T +1
blocks.
But in degraded wiretap channel cases, form (24) we can have lim N →∞ L t /N = 0, which implies that the weak security can be achieved in this cases.
Since we have proven the weak security of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure in the degraded delay CSI case, we briefly analyse its achievable secrecy rate.
Proposition 3
In degraded delay CSI case, the secrecy rate of the polar coding based OTP chaining structure can almost achieve the secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption for the entire T + 1 times block communication.
Proof: Let R s (T + 1) be the secrecy rate of entire T + 1 time block communication. Since in t-th block communication encrypted messages are transmitted in the subset I t−1 , we have
where (a) is due to (23) of degraded wiretap channel cases. Thus the secrecy rate can almost achieve the average secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption.
In the next section, we will abandon the preliminary solution of assigning the subset B with publicly known frozen bits, and explore a new solution to solve the remaining strong security problem of non-degraded cases under the delay CSI assumption.
IV. SECURE POLAR CODING FOR STRONG SECURITY
As discussed in the previous section, for the communication model of non-degraded delay CSI assumption, the constructed polar coding based encrypted chaining structure can not achieve the security under the reliability criterion, due to the existence of the neither secure nor reliable subset B t . Thus in this section, we present a new solution for this remaining problem and construct a modified secure polar coding scheme which can achieve strong security and reliability simultaneously.
A. Further Discussions on Strong Security
In our preliminary solution for subset B t with the delay CSI assumption, U Bt t is assigned with publicly known frozen bits for achieving the reliability, which however has already been proven for compromising the security.
For the non-degraded wiretap channel with the perfect CSI assumption, this conflict between reliability and security has already been solved by the technique of polar code based multi-block chaining structure proposed in [4] . The basic idea of this strong security solution is to convey the bits of U B to legitimate receiver Bob separately while keeping it safe from the eavesdropper Eve. Then in the multi-block chaining structure, for any block t, a reliable and secure subset E t that satisfies |E t | = |B t+1 | is separated from the subset I t . Then E t is set for carrying uniformly distributed random bits which will be used for assigning the subset B t+1 in block t + 1. Thus when decoding, Bob can directly decode the bits in subset B t+1 by the decoded random bits of
However under the delay CSI assumption, this multi-block chaining structure cannot be directly applied. According to the delay CSI assumption, the subset B t+1 cannot be identified by the legitimate parties only until (t + 1)-th block communication is complete. Thus without knowing the subset B t+1 , the corresponding subset E t in t-th block communication cannot be constructed.
Also the subset B t can not be assigned independently from F t .
Therefore, to achieve both strong security and reliability, we have to find a feasible solution for this unidentifiable problem of B t under the delay CSI assumption. Note that in the constructed system model of delay CSI assumption, although subset B t can not be identified when encoding, subset L X|Y c is known and fixed for any s i ∈ S. Thus if we could conveying random bits for the known and fixed L X|Y c , then we can get around the unidentifiable problem of B t since
The basic method for carrying out this alternative idea is applying the multi-block chaining structure directly on the subset L X|Y c . However, although this basic method may be able to achieve both the reliability and strong security, it will also cause unacceptable secrecy rate sacrifice. Considering the L X|Y c based multi-block chaining structure, for block t, construct a subset E t from I t that satisfies |E t | = | L X|Y c |. Then for the achievable secrecy rate of block
where C s is the secrecy capacity of a single block, R F is the rate of subset F. Thus as shown in (43), part of the secrecy capacity is sacrificed if directly apply the multi-block chaining structure on the subset L X|Y c .
B. Modified Multi-block Chaining Structure
As we discussed in the last subsection, to achieve the strong security and reliability in delay CSI case, we have to find a method to convey random bits for the known and fixed L X|Y c without unacceptable rate sacrifice. Thus on this target, we present a new solution called modified multi-block chaining structure.
Note that in the alternative idea, subset L X|Y c is going to transmit random bits instead of the publicly known frozen bits of the preliminary solution. Since F ⊆ H X|Z , random bits in F can be secure from eavesdropper Eve. Also in the delay CSI case, the realization of CSI can be obtained by the legitimate parties after every block communication, by then they can have the actual subset F and B for knowing which part of the random bits in H X|Z is secure in the just completed block communication. Based on this point, we use the subset F to construct a modified multi-block chaining structure.
The modified structure is illustrated in Fig. 3 . For every time legitimate parties obtain the CSI realization of the just completed block communication, they can know the actual divided subsets (I, R, B, F) by (19) . For all the potential CSI value s i ∈ S, we assume that
we divide the subset I into two parts B and I that satisfies B ⊂ I, |B | = B and I = I \ B .
At the beginning of time 0, set a secure pre-shared frozen bits between Alice and Bob for assigning the L X|Y c . Then random bits are assigned to L X|Y . When the block communication of time 0 is completed, legitimate parties can obtain the CSI realization s 0 . Accordingly they can identify the part of the pre-shared frozen bits that remains secure during the just completed Fig. 3 . The modified multi-block chaining structure for delay CSI assumption.
transmission as the U Then Alice can identify the bits in L X|Y c that remains secure as U Then the following blocks just repeat these operations. Therefore random bits of L X|Y c can be conveyed from Alice to Bob separately and securely over the blocks.
C. Strong Security Polar Coding Scheme
By combining the modified multi-block chaining structure with the OTP chaining structure, we present the strong security polar coding scheme for the non-degraded communication model of delay CSI assumption.
Block communication of time 0:
• Legitimate parties obtain the polarized subsets of main channel as L X|Y and L X|Y c ;
• Assigning the u N 0 for polar coding: -uniformly distributed random bits are assigned to subset L X|Y ; -pre-shared and secure frozen bits are assigned to subset L X|Y c ;
• After the block communication, with the delay CSI realization s 0 .
-Alice identifies u • Legitimate parties obtain the divided subsets of last block as
by the CSI realization s t−1 ;
• Assume a message M t that satisfies
• Assigning the u N t for polar coding: -ciphertext E t is assigned to subset I t−1 ;
-random bits of u 
corresponding bit inû
• Bob extractsû 
D. Performance Analysis
Now we analyze the performance of the proposed strong security polar coding scheme and theoretically discuss its reliability, security and secrecy rate under the delay CSI assumption. 1) Reliability: reliability of the proposed strong security polar coding scheme is on the error probability of decoding the ciphertext, key stream and the random bits of subset B from time 0 to time T .
Proposition 4
The reliability criterion can be achieved by the proposed strong security polar coding scheme under the delay CSI assumption.
Proof: Similar as in Proposition 1, for the error probability of entire T + 1 times block communication, have
which proves the reliability.
2) Strong security: In the proposed strong security polar coding scheme, key streams are 
Proposition 5 The strong security criterion can be achieved by the proposed strong security polar coding scheme under the reliability criterion for delay CSI assumption.
Proof: For block t, denote I t = U 
Now we perform a similar analysis operation as in [4] on the L(T + 1) for the modified multi-block chaining structure. Let
where (a) is due to Markov chain
and (b) is due to Markov chain
Since Eve do not know the initially pre-shared frozen bits for L X|Y c at time 0, have
I(I t , B t , F t ; Z t ).
Also because R t are set for transmitting random bits, have 
where (a) is because U a i are independent from each other; (b) is due to I t ∪ B t ∪ F t = H X|Z , 
Z(X|Y )
which proves the strong security.
3) Secrecy rate: Now we discuss the achievable secrecy rate under the reliability and strong security criterions.
Proposition 6
For the entire T + 1 times block communication with delay CSI assumption, the achievable secrecy rate of our proposed strong security polar coding scheme can almost reach the average secrecy capacity of the perfect CSI assumption under the reliability and strong security criterions.
Proof: According to the proposed strong security polar coding scheme, ciphertext are carried by U 
and with a large enough T , we can have
where C s−perfectCSI (S) is average secrecy capacity of the perfect CSI assumption over the set S.
Therefore under the delay CSI assumption, the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed strong security polar coding scheme can almost reach the average secrecy capacity of the perfect CSI assumption.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a communication model of delay CSI assumption on the simplified compound wiretap channel. On this model, we intent to find an explicit physical layer secure coding solution to achieve a secure and reliable communication.
First we have constructed a polar coding based OTP chaining structure. In order to achieve the reliability, we have presented a preliminary solution for the unidentifiable problem of the neither secure nor reliable subset B that we assign the subset H X ∩ L X|Y c with publicly known frozen bits. However, with this preliminary solution, the proposed structure can only achieve weak security in degraded delay CSI cases, but fail to achieve weak or strong security in non-degraded delay CSI cases.
Therefore, in order to achieve both strong security and reliability in non-degraded delay CSI cases, we have discussed the remaining problems for applying the multi-block chaining structure, and presented an alternative solution of conveying random bits for the known and fixed L X|Y c instead of the unknown subset B. Based on this idea, we have presented a modified multi-block chaining structure by using the secure subset F and subset B for conveying the bits for L X|Y c . Finally by combining this modified multi-block chaining structure with the OTP chaining structure, we have constructed a strong security polar coding scheme which, as theoretically proven, can almost achieve the average secrecy capacity of perfect CSI assumption under the delay CSI assumption with both reliability and strong security.
